

# Financial Assessment (NMDB Configuration)

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Australia's National Science Agency

#### An assessment of the historic Bradfield Scheme to divert water inland from north Queensland

A technical report to the National Water Grid Authority from the CSIRO Bradfield Scheme Assessment

Petheram C<sup>1</sup>, Read A<sup>1</sup>, Hughes J<sup>1</sup>, Stokes C<sup>1</sup>, Philip S<sup>1</sup>, Peake A<sup>1</sup>, Marvanek S<sup>1</sup>, Yang A<sup>2</sup>, Devlin K<sup>2</sup>, Rogers L<sup>1</sup>, Wilson P<sup>1</sup>, Baynes F<sup>1</sup>, Podger G<sup>1</sup>, Macintosh A<sup>2</sup>, Stratford D<sup>1</sup>, Potter N<sup>1</sup>, Kim S<sup>1</sup>, Tredger R<sup>2</sup>, Barber M<sup>3</sup>, Wang B<sup>3</sup>, McJannet D<sup>3</sup>, Jarvis D<sup>7</sup>, Vanderbyl T<sup>9</sup>, Watson I<sup>4</sup> and Chilcott C<sup>1</sup>

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## An assessment of contemporary variations of the Bradfield Scheme

A technical report to the National Water Grid Authority from the CSIRO Bradfield Scheme Assessment

Petheram C<sup>1</sup>, Read A<sup>2</sup>, Hughes J<sup>2</sup>, Marvanek S<sup>2</sup>, Stokes C<sup>2</sup>, Kim S<sup>2</sup>, Philip S<sup>3</sup>, Peake A<sup>3</sup>, Podger G<sup>2</sup>, Devlin K<sup>2</sup>, Hayward J<sup>3</sup>, Bartley R<sup>3</sup>, Vanderbyl T<sup>4</sup>, Wilson P<sup>3</sup>, Pena Arancibia J<sup>3</sup>, Stratford D<sup>3</sup>, Watson I<sup>3</sup>, Austin J<sup>3</sup>, Yang A<sup>3</sup>, Barber M<sup>3</sup>, Ibrahimi T<sup>3</sup>, Rogers L<sup>3</sup>, Kuhnert P<sup>3</sup>, Wang B<sup>3</sup>, Potter N<sup>3</sup>, Baynes F<sup>5</sup>, Ng S<sup>3</sup>, Cousins A<sup>3</sup>, Jarvis D<sup>6</sup> and Chilcott C<sup>3</sup>

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## Detailed Multi-component Financial Model (NMDB)

- (Market) Costs, Benefits, & Resource use over lifespan (100y)
- Accounting by Components (& transfers: capacity to pay)
- Comprehensive framework for anticipatable risks

SCHEME	= All infrastructure and costs for capturing and diverting water, establishing a new	Inset A Mairees P Cains Darwing
Cabana assauntina (assaunta d	irrigation area, and growing produce to farmers receiving payment for produce	Gairy BASIN JOHNSTONE RIVER BASIN After Springs TULLY RIVER BASIN After Springs
	for in each component below):	Kat madd San Kat M
Costs:	Initial capital costs of developed assets	Hell Solhes dum Ownsville Perth Adelaide Melbourne
	Renewal/replacement costs of assets (based on lifespans)	Hobart
	O&M costs of assets (reccurent - annual)	Charter lowers  Glendown  Claim  Charter  Charte
	Other recurrent costs for each asset (pumping, net loss in hydro power generation)	-flughenden Webb Lake BURDEKIN RIVER BASIN
	Annual production costs (for each source of revenue)	COOPER CREEK
Revenue:	Gross revenue payed to farmers for all agricultural produce	BASIN fongreach Emerald Prockhampton
Resource use:	Water use (and transfers between components) each year	A rizrov sver
	Area of farmland in production (using water and generating revenue) each year	Bundaberg
Scheme structure / Investment	components:	WARREGO RIVER BASIN
BACKBONE	= Everything for water storage and diversion down to point of discharge	Charleville Suprom
Dams	= Dams and associated infrastructure other than tunnels and channels	Bodes Not
Inter-basin diversion	= Tunnels and channels used to transfer water between river basins	Consideration (In the constant of the constant
IRRIGATION AREA	= Point of water extraction to farmers receiving payment for produce	Goodwindt S
Off-farm	= Roads and transmission lines to connect new irrigation area	BASIN
Farms (4 types)	= Water extracted by farms to farmer receiving payment for produce	White Cliffs Bourke Walgett NAMOLENER
	Capital costs of farm development	
	Farm set up (buildings, machinery, equipment, machinery, other structures)	Existing dam     Potential channel     Potential dam     Potential dam     Potential tunnel (Bradfield 1938)     Classell
	Crop growing costs (excluding costs of water supply)	Potential terminal storage Potential pipeline (Bradfield 1948) Sandy and loamy soil 0 100 200
	Sale of farm produce	Existing reservoir     Watercourse     Irrigated agriculture     Kilometres



### Realistic financial Performance NMDB

Not viable: -1.8% IRR, 8% costs covered, ~\$3200/ML (Hence rationale for 'Upper Bound': Could it ever be viable?)

ITEM	UNITS	UPPER BOUND	+ MODERATE RISKS	
Scheme financial performance				
Net present value (\$ billion)	\$ billion	-11.1	-16.2	
Benefit cost ratio	\$/\$	0.25	0.08	
Internal rate of return (discount rate at which NPV = 0)	%	2.0	-1.8	
Proportion of off-farm costs irrigators can cover	%	25	8	
Water pricing (per supplied megalitre)		,		
Metered price supplier would need to charge	\$/ML	-2,310	-3,220	
Inter-basin diversion component of water cost (\$/ML)	\$/ML	-1,920	-2,690	
Combined scheme irrigators can afford to pay (\$/ML)	\$/ML	580	250	
Water pricing (ongoing entitlement)	·			
Entitlement price supplier would need to charge	\$ per ML/y	-28,200	-37,500	
Ongoing service charge	\$/ML	-200	-230	
% Off-farm capital costs farm entitlements could cover	%	18	1	



## 'Upper Bound' Over-optimistic Assumptions

- Rationale: Could a Bradfield-style Scheme ever be viable?
- Export citrus as outlier >\$3000 Gross Margin per ML orchard lifecycle Horticulture ~\$250 Gross Margin per ML typical/mix (cf. GHD)
- 30,000 ha expansion in 30 years
  - QLD horticulture growth projection by 2050 < 13,000 ha</li>
  - 2.8b/y gross revenue ~+30% current Australia fruit, veg. + nut
  - Currently ~5,300 ha citrus in QLD
- Why would greenfield developers pay diversion premium?
  - 'Balancing' scheme losses with 'altruistic' investors/farmers
- Ignores anticipatable risks

## Unattainable Upper Bound\* NMDB Scheme \$

- Infrastructure capital costs estimated at ~\$21b (~17b diversion)
- Could irrigate 30,000 ha export citrus\*; 80,000 ha new cotton; +shortfall
- Not viable\* (7% DR): 2% IRR, 25% costs covered, ~\$2300/ML
- Diversion infrastructure alone contributes ~\$1900/ML (82%)
- Regional gross benefit (agriculture) ~\$6b/y and <11,000 jobs</li>
- Lifetime discounted *GROSS* farm revenue < infrastructure cost



#### **PRIMARY:**

Diversion costs (>\$1900/ML) >>> Value added by diversion (<<\$300/ML)</li>
 Value add of meeting shortfall in existing vs new/'greenfield' broadacre farms
 Even if scheme were viable/subsidised, would be better without excessive diversion

#### **SECONDARY:**

- Lower crop water use efficiency at inland locations (disbenefit)
- New broadacre farming has no realistic prospect of affording water Best case broadacre could afford (~\$580/ML) <<< scheme cost (>>\$2300 /ML)
- Bigger is not necessarily better
   'Oversized' water infrastructure: demand takes decades to catch up to supply High-value water users cannot scale rapidly to use new water (reduced PV)



- Quick and clearcut findings
   'Over-optimism' wastes \$ & time pursuing inferior options
- Identified principles for better, cheaper alternatives
   Can achieve similar outcomes at lower cost using water in place
   Avoid excessive diversion costs, use limited water more efficiently
   Progressively build supply to meet growing demand
   (e.g., interconnected regional grids (Tom)...)







## Additional Info

• Slides are NOT part of main presentation.





## Alternative configurations (nearer, smaller, staged)

- Using water near source reduce diversion costs
- Build smaller storages match supply to lags in ramping up high value users
- Scale and match supply to demand reduce 'wastage' while markets grow
- Can achieve similar objectives at lower cost and risk

PARAMETER	UPPER HERBERT	FLINDERS DIVERSION	NMDB DIVERSION
	SMALL, LOCAL	'BETTER' BRADFIELD	CONTEMPORARY
PROJECT INFRASTRUTURE COSTS			
Capital cost (\$ million)	382	12,200	21,000
% Capital cost on diversion	0%	90%	95%
Net operating cost (\$ million/y)	2.25	157	200
SCHEME PERFORMANCE - MODERATE RISKS			
New gross revenue from agriculture (\$ million/y)	700	2,600	2,800
New gross revenue: capital cost (ratio)	1.83	0.21	0.13
Cost of supplying water (\$/ML)	1,940	1,350	3,220
Benefit cost ratio	0.19	0.08	0.08



## Financial Performance (Bradfield variants)

Table 14-19 Comparison of costs and benefits (upper bound and after moderate risks) among four water development options

The new gross revenue from agriculture provides an indicator of the potential regional benefit and is also given relative to the capital cost of the new infrastructure. The benefit cost ratio indicates the proportion of the schemes costs irrigators would be able to cover.

PARAMETER	UPPER HERBERT CATCHMENT	DESERT UPLANDS	FLINDERS DIVERSION	NORTHERN MDB DIVERSION
PROJECT INFRASTRUTURE COSTS				
Capital cost (\$ million)	382	4,760	12,200	21,000
% Capital cost on diversion	0%	75%	90%	95%
Net operating cost (\$ million/y)	2.25	32.4	157	200
MODERATE RISKS				
New gross revenue from agriculture (\$ million/y)	700	2,100	2,600	2,800
New gross revenue: capital cost	1.83	0.44	0.21	0.13
Cost of supplying water (\$/ML)	1,940	11,750	1,350	3,220
Benefit cost ratio	0.19	0.04	0.08	0.01
UPPER BOUND				
New gross revenue from agriculture (\$ million/y)	900	2,800	3,400	3,700
New gross revenue: capital cost	2.36	0.59	0.28	0.18
Cost of supplying water (\$/ML)	930	3,560	970	2,310
Benefit cost ratio	2.72	0.46	0.43	0.25



### Risks and Sensitives (vs 'Upper bound' assumptions)

- Discount rate: IRR needs to be greater than target discount rate
- 25% lower crop price (or yield): cost covered reduces to 3%
- Modest combined risks: -1.8% IRR; 8% \$ covered; +40% water cost (vs 'Upper bound' case: 2% IRR; 25% \$ covered; \$2300/ML)
- 'Over-Optimism' wastes \$ & time pursuing non-viable options





Modest combined risks = (+20% backbone \$, -15% farm revenue, 90% water supply)

NMDB			
Risk / Sensitivity	IRR (%)	Proportion of costs irrigators can cover (%)	Cost of supplied water (\$/ML)
Optimistic assumptions - base (7% discount rate)	2.0	25	2,310
Optimistic: 3% discount rate (off-farm investors)	2.0	73	940
Optimistic: 5% discount rate (off-farm investors)	2.0	41	1,550
Optimistic: 10% discount rate (off-farm investors)	2.0	14	3,760
Optimistic: 10% discount rate (farm investors)	1.5	21	2,310
Double backbone infrastructure cost	0.6	13	4,430
Double backbone construction time	1.8	18	3,290
Farms gradually established (10 y and 90 y)	1.3	19	2,560
5-year delay to establish first farms (approvals)	1.9	19	3,140
Half suitable land (100% reliability)	0.1	13	4,450
-50% water supply volume (10 pctl climate change)	0.0	13	4,620
-10% water supply volume (median climate change)	1.7	23	2,570
+30% water supply volume (90 pctl climate change)	2.8	33	1,780
Initial farm underperformance (learning)	1.5	21	2,310
25% lower crop gross revenue (yield and/or price)	n/a	3	2,310
New technology (-20% crop cost 10 years after start	2.8	31	2,310
Early setback/biosecurity (no production for 5 years)	1.3	20	2,310
Modest combined risks (7% discount rate)	-1.8	8	3,220
Modest combined risks (5% off-farm discount rate)	-1.8	12	2,160
Modest combined risks (3% off-farm discount rate)	-1.8	21	1,310
Modest combined risks (10% farm discount rate)	n/a	6	3,220